Introduction
The Islamic headscarf, an innocuous piece of cloth worn by Muslim women in accordance with their religious beliefs, has for years been the subject of controversy.
Muslim women claim a right to wear the headscarf in accordance with their religious beliefs while the Western world views the headscarf as a symbol of oppression and terrorism forced onto women by a patriarchal religion. The debate has grown in recent times with the increasing visibility of the Muslim population and their assertiveness of their Islamic identity and human rights. 1 However, unlike other disputes regarding the compatibility of religious practices with modern values, the debate has not been confined to the private sphere to be resolved among members of the religion. States are embroiled in the debate and have gone so far as to enact legislation prohibiting the wearing of a headscarf. This article critically examines the reasons underlying these bans and argues that these prohibitions are not justified from any human rights perspective. Section 2 analyses the place of the headscarf in Islam, its religious basis and significance to Muslim women. Section 3 examines bans on the headscarf in France, Turkey and Switzerland in order to identify the most popular justifications advanced for banning the headscarf. Section 4 argues that the reasons advanced by many European states and accepted by courts for banning the headscarf do not justify a headscarf ban. (17)4 him) upon seeing Asma bint Abu Bakr wearing thin clothes indicated that upon reaching puberty a woman should cover her entire body except her hands and face when in public. 8 Consequently, the four main schools of Islamic jurisprudence, 9 which represent the dominant mainstream understanding of Islamic law, have interpreted the Qur'anic verses to mean that females upon reaching puberty are obliged to cover their heads in public. 10 Historically, Muslim scholars have agreed that Muslim women are obliged to cover their heads in public and debate has revolved around whether Muslim women are also obliged to cover their face and hands in public. 11 Accordingly, the general consensus amongst Muslim scholars is that the headscarf is obligatory in Islam. The obligation extends to all activities including work and school, and is not relaxed even for brief periods of physical activity. The headscarf should thus not be regarded merely as a religious symbol such as a cross worn by some Christians but rather understood as a mandatory requirement of the Islamic faith.
Furthermore, wearing a headscarf is also generally considered to be a manifestation of religion protected by the right to freedom of religion. The United Nations Human Rights Committee has stated that the observance and practice of religion includes, inter alia, the wearing of distinctive clothing or head coverings. 12 This interpretation accords with the more recent jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights ("ECtHR") which has in Dahlab v Switzerland 13 and Sahin v Turkey 14 assumed that wearing a headscarf is a religious practice and decided both cases on the basis of whether the interference with religious freedom was justifiable. South Africa, 15 like 8 ad-Darsh Muslim Women's Dress 7-8. Some scholars consider this hadith to be weak and unreliable and argue that women are obliged to cover their faces and hands when in public. 9 The four schools, being Shafi'i, Hanafi, Maliki and Hanbali, represent different schools of thought on the interpretation of religious material and are named after the Muslim jurists who founded the school of thought. the United States of America, 16 Canada 17 and Germany, 18 adopts a subjective test for determining whether conduct constitutes a protectable manifestation of religion.
The subjective test protects conduct based on sincerely held religious beliefs and does not require claimants to prove that the conduct is an objective requirement of their religion. This means that, in the absence of real evidence that a claimant is acting fraudulently, wearing a headscarf would be protected by religious freedom in these jurisdictions. Accordingly, any assessment as to the justifiability of a headscarf ban must take cognisance of the fact that the headscarf is regarded as a mandatory requirement of the Islamic faith and generally considered to be protected by the right to freedom of religion.
3.
Legislative bans of the headscarf
France
In France, the debate regarding the banning of the headscarf began in 1989 when a school suspended 3 Muslim girls for wearing headscarves to school. 19 The debate culminated in the 2004 French law prohibiting students in public schools from wearing clothing manifesting a religious affiliation 20 (hereinafter referred to as "the French Headscarf Ban"). The French Headscarf Ban states:
In public elementary, middle and high schools, the wearing of signs or clothing which conspicuously manifest students' religious affiliations is prohibited.
Disciplinary procedures to implement this rule will be preceded by a discussion with the student. The ban, which was upheld by the ECtHR, 34 targeted the headscarf and was aimed at students in tertiary institutions, but has not been enforced since about September 2010 when Turkey indicated that "it would support any student disciplined or expelled for covering her head". 35 Leyla Sahin was a fifth-year medical student who was refused access to examinations and lectures on her enrolment at Istanbul University on the basis that she wore a headscarf in contravention of the regulations. 36 The ECtHR endorsed the approach of its Chamber, which held that the ban was necessary to preserve secularism, protect the equality rights of women and combat extremist political The ECtHR held that the principle of secularism was the paramount consideration underlying the headscarf ban and held:
In such a context, where the values of pluralism, respect for the rights of others, and in particular, equality before the law of men and women are being taught and applied in practice, it is understandable that the relevant authorities should wish to preserve the secular nature of the institution concerned and so consider it contrary to such values to allow religious attire, as in the present case, the Islamic headscarf, to be worn.
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The ECtHR also suggested that the Islamic requirement that women wear a headscarf and the headscarf itself were inconsistent with the value of equality. The
ECtHR endorsed its previous findings in Dahlab v Switzerland 39 in which it held that:
[the headscarf] appeared to be imposed on women by a religious precept that was hard to reconcile with the principle of gender equality. It also noted that wearing the Islamic headscarf could not easily be reconciled with the message of tolerance, respect for others and, above all, equality and non-discrimination that all teachers in a democratic society must convey to their pupils. 40 The judgment, however, did not elaborate on why or how the headscarf conflicts with equality, tolerance or respect for others or how the ban could curb extremism.
Judge Tulkens, in a minority judgment, delivered an astute critique of the majority judgment which questioned how the majority simply accepted that the ban was necessary to protect secularism or achieve equality without explaining why or how this is so. Judge Tulkens stated that by simply assuming that the headscarf conflicts with secularism when there was no evidence to this effect, the majority placed its own interpretation upon the headscarf, which was unacceptable. 41 The majority's evaluation of wearing a headscarf as a negative practice, which led to its upholding the ban, was criticised as an improper paternalistic approach, and Judge Tulkens Switzerland successfully defended its prohibition on wearing a headscarf in the ECtHR. The state relied on certain seemingly neutral statutory provisions which did not explicitly prohibit the headscarf but were argued to provide general values to which civil servants should adhere and which could be translated into specific orders, 44 such as banning the headscarf. The state argued that the prohibition was meant to protect the principle of "denominational neutrality in schools" and to promote "religious harmony". 45 The state argued that Dahlab as a civil servant was a representative of the state and her conduct should not suggest that the state endorsed a particular religion. 46 The ECtHR held that the prohibition pursued the legitimate aims of protecting the rights and freedoms of others, public safety and public order, 47 and seemed to implicitly accept that the prohibition was necessary to protect religious harmony and neutrality.
A further critical aspect of the case was the young ages of the pupils taught by Dahlab. Dahlab taught pupils aged between four and eight and the ECtHR held that the prohibition on teachers wearing a headscarf was necessary to prevent the 
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"The public education system shall ensure that the political and religious beliefs of pupils and parents are respected" and "Civil servants must be lay persons; derogations from this provision shall be permitted only in respect of university teaching staff." Ss 6 and 12 Canton of Geneva Public Education Act of 6 November 1940 as cited in Dahlab v Switzerland 4-5.
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F OSMAN PER / PELJ 2014 (17)4 coercion of young children. 48 It was assumed, without any evidence in support thereof, that the mere wearing of a headscarf could have a proselytising effect on young children, which needed to be curbed. As previously stated, the ECtHR also considered the wearing of the headscarf to be incompatible with the principle of gender equality as the Qur'an imposes it on women only, and found that the prohibition might be necessary to protect gender equality. 49
Justifications for a headscarf ban
The aforegoing analysis of prominent headscarf bans reveals that there are four main justifications for banning the headscarf, namely protecting secularism, preventing coercion, promoting equality and guarding against religious extremism.
This section evaluates the veracity of these justifications and whether or not they indeed support a headscarf ban. 50
Secularism
The protection of secularism is perhaps one of the most popular justifications advocated by states and accepted by courts for banning the headscarf. Secularism is generally thought to be the separation of religion and state, a principle that requires the state to be neutral with respect to religion and not to promote a religious, or irreligious, point of view. The state is seen as an "impartial organiser" of the exercise of religion, which does not assess the legitimacy of religious beliefs or the way in which they are expressed. 51 The impartiality of the state is thought to be important to prevent the abuse of state power and to ensure that dominantly practised religions are not favoured at the expense of minority religions. There is, however, some disagreement as to how strict the separation between religion and the state should be, and what is required in order to achieve state neutrality. (17)4 behind a headscarf ban appears to be that girls cannot be forced to wear a headscarf if it is banned by the state. 74 However, it is not clear that the perpetrators of coercion will adopt this reasoning. Individuals may nonetheless believe that girls have a choice of whether or not to wear a headscarf and whether to wear a headscarf even if it means foregoing their education. Girls may now simply be prevented from attending school or university if they are not allowed to wear a headscarf at these institutions. 75 Girls who choose to attend school without a headscarf may thus still find themselves to be the victims of abuse and harassment, but this time in the form of pressure to forgo their education.
The state should prohibit the coercion itself rather than enact an obscure headscarf ban which may not achieve its purpose. Zhurnalova 76 argues that a more appropriate solution to coercion is communicating with families and social service activities directed at identifying and ending the coercion of girls. The implementation of proper disciplinary measures and criminal law enforcement can also prevent coercion when in the form of harassment and abuse. 77 Weil, 78 however, notes that these alternative solutions, while preferable, may be practically difficult to achieve.
Coercion is often hard to identify, prove and sanction, and young victims may also be reluctant to identify perpetrators for fear of being ostracised and victimised by their community. 79 However, the difficulty in implementing these measures does not justify enacting a headscarf ban. The alternative measures proposed by Zhurnalova are complex and involved, but offer a real solution to what is a deeply-rooted social problem which cannot be addressed by a law which focuses on the outcome of coercion and not the coercion itself.
In respect of the coercive impact a headscarf may have on those who do not wear it, the argument is often raised and is perhaps most persuasive in a school context (17)4 where a teacher wears a headscarf while teaching. 80 It is the mere wearing of a headscarf by a teacher, who occupies a position of authority and acts as a role model for students, which is thought to have a coercive effect on students, and it is irrelevant whether the teacher actually says anything to promote a religious belief or influence students. The situation may be problematic as students are a "captive audience" who cannot without some difficulty escape the manifestation of religion, for instance by changing class or schools. 81 The potential for coercion is heightened with young students who may be vulnerable to the views of a teacher and are more likely to emulate a teacher's behaviour. 82 While any form of proselytising or coercion may be unacceptable in a school context, it is wrong to equate the mere wearing of a headscarf with proselytising or coercion.
A teacher undoubtedly conveys her religious beliefs to students by wearing a headscarf, but there is nothing to suggest that being able to identify the religious faith of a teacher induces students to imitate a teacher's religious beliefs. There is no evidence in Dahlab v Switzerland or any other case on the effect of wearing a headscarf on young children. The absence of real evidence as to the effect a headscarf may have on students should preclude assertions that a headscarf interferes with the religious freedom of students. 83 The coercion which states must guard against is when teachers exploit their position of authority, as a representative of the school, to influence the religious beliefs of young, impressionable students.
This possibility exists regardless of whether or not a teacher wears a headscarf, and a headscarf ban is a misdirected attempt by the state to guard against such coercion. Once again, authorities should focus on the coercion itself rather than the headscarf.
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This argument was also raised in Leyla Sahin v Turkey where the ECtHR held that the wearing of the headscarf by Sahin may have a proselytising effect and exert pressure on non-Muslims. Not only is it questionable whether Sahin, a university student herself, would be able to exert pressure on fellow university students, but the finding conflicts with the ECtHR's finding in Kokkinakis v Greece App No 14307/88 (1994) 17 EHRR 397 that proselytism is protected by the right to manifest a religion. (17)4 4.3 Equality A more peripheral argument used to justify a headscarf ban is that a headscarf is incompatible with equality and that a ban is necessary to protect the rights of women. While Weil stated that this is an unacceptable state interpretation of a religious practice which breaches state neutrality, it has been relied upon by the ECtHR in upholding the ban on the headscarf. The ECtHR, however, has never clearly explained why a headscarf is incompatible with gender equality or how the ban achieves sexual equality. The headscarf appears to be considered a sexist practice as the Qu'ran imposes it women and not men and may result in a woman's religiosity being judged according to whether or not she wears a headscarf while a Muslim man's religiosity cannot be judged by dress. 84 However, most religions treat men and women differently by imposing different religious obligations on them, and such differential treatment has never justified legislative interference. For example, the Catholic Church does not allow women to be ordained as priests and in terms of Jewish law only a husband may initiate a divorce. While these are clearly sexist practices, religious adherents may nonetheless voluntarily abide by them in accordance with their religious convictions. Neither the state nor the court should prohibit practices voluntarily undertaken in accordance with religious beliefs in order to impose equality on religions.
A headscarf, however, is often treated differently from other religious practices as it is viewed as a symbol of Islam's oppression of women, which should be abolished.
While Muslim women may wear a headscarf to comply with their religious obligations, a headscarf is often interpreted very differently by non-Muslims.
Poulter 85 notes that a headscarf is sometimes interpreted to mean that women should be inconspicuous, confined to domestic roles and completely segregated from men. Furthermore, as the Qur'anic verses quoted earlier in this article suggest that a headscarf is a means of protecting women from unwanted interferences, some feminists question why men cannot control themselves so that women can dress as requiring the identical treatment of individuals but rather that individuals should be treated with equal concern and respect, 90 then a headscarf ban is unfair and unjustified. This is because a ban does not afford equal concern and respect to the religious beliefs of Muslim women who believe they are obliged to wear a headscarf.
Religious extrem ism
After the attacks on 11 September 2001 on the World Trade Centre, which were subsequently attributed to the Muslim organisation Al-Qaeda, a headscarf has also become a symbol of religious extremism. While the argument that a headscarf ban is necessary to curb religious extremism is tenuous, it is nonetheless addressed as it is an emotive argument frequently alluded to in discussions on banning the headscarf.
A headscarf ban to curb terrorism equates the mere wearing of a headscarf with the holding of fundamentalist views. 91 This overlooks the fact that Muslim women with no connection to terrorism may wear a headscarf to comply with the requirements of the Islamic faith. Such blatant racial profiling and prejudice should never justify a headscarf ban. Even if it is assumed that Muslim women who wear a headscarf hold extremist views, banning the headscarf does not mean that these women will cease to hold or spread these views. State action should be directed against the real threat, which is religious fundamentalism, and not against the headscarf. 92 While it is easy to incite people against the headscarf on the basis of stopping terrorism, it can never in truth justify a headscarf ban.
A South African perspective
While the headscarf is becoming an increasingly contentious issue worldwide, 93
South African courts have yet to encounter a headscarf ban. However, there have See Lenta 2007 SALJ 296. Lenta discusses the incidents where a social worker was dismissed from employment at a South African prison for wearing a headscarf and where a schoolgirl was ordered to remove her headscarf as it breached the school's uniform requirements. Also the South African Navy Dress Regulations do not make accommodation for a headscarf to be worn and may be subject to a possible constitutional challenge in the future. See South African Navy date unknown http://www.navy.mil.za/aboutus/uniform/dressregulations/index.htm. that when a state prohibits a central practice of a religion it places a severe burden on religious adherents forcing them to contravene their religious beliefs or break the law. According to Lenta, 104 such a situation is discriminatory as adherents of major religions are unlikely ever to be placed in such a predicament. While the court refused to grant the exemption in CESA and Prince, the cases illustrate that any claim for an exemption will be balanced carefully against the countervailing state interest, and religious adherents will not be allowed to rely on their religious beliefs to infringe on the rights of others or important societal goals. The appellants, however, argued that the discrimination was justifiable as it aimed to eliminate the risk and anomaly of having officers working in prisons who adhered to a religion or culture that promoted illegal drug use. 117 The appellants argued that the problem was not the hairstyle but rather the Rastafarianism faith and Xhosa cultural practice, which required them to use the illegal and harmful dagga in their observance. 118 The SCA noted that discrimination on a listed ground, such as religion, culture and gender, is presumed to be unfair and the employer must prove the contrary. 120 In determining whether the discrimination is fair or unfair the court will consider the position of the victim in society, the purpose of the discrimination, the existence of less restrictive means to achieve the purpose, the extent to which the victim's rights had been infringed, and the impact on the victim's human dignity. 121 The SCA held that the dress code had a profound impact on the respondents, as adherence to their sincerely held beliefs had cost them their jobs. 122 The discrimination may, nonetheless, have been fair if it was based on inherent requirements of the job. 123 The appellants, in what was a poorly argued case, failed to establish this. The appellants' oral argument, that the dreadlocks rendered them vulnerable to manipulation and corruption, was different to their argument in evidence that the dress code was necessary to entrench uniformity and neatness, which would promote discipline and security in prisons. 124 Accordingly the SCA, critical of the change in argument and the lack of evidence to support the oral argument, dismissed the appeal. However, the poor manner in which the case was argued means that it is devoid of any real balancing of competing interests. It nonetheless demonstrates that the court takes seriously the balancing exercise and will not accept unconvincing and unsubstantiated arguments to justify discrimination.
In the light of the above, it is arguable that South African courts will expect schools and employers to accommodate the headscarf. 125 First, the earlier discussion in this article on the centrality of the headscarf in the Islamic faith and that it is generally considered a mandatory requirement in Islam demonstrates the importance of the headscarf to Muslim females. The question of whether Muslim females will be entitled to have their religious beliefs accommodated will depend on balancing the religious interests of Muslim women against the conflicting interests in banning the headscarf.
See also Lenta 2007 SALJ, where he convincingly argues that schools and employers are obliged to accommodate the headscarf.
Secondly, the popular reasons for banning a headscarf scrutinised in this article are unlikely to justify a headscarf ban in South Africa. South Africa does not ascribe to the strict interpretation of secularism or aspire to create a single national identity for all its citizens. The South African Constitution, which provides for eleven official languages, allows religious observance in state institutions and protects both the individual and group right to culture, promotes inclusivity and accommodates difference. 126 This means that the protection of secularism is unlikely to be a valid justification in South Africa. Furthermore, the connection between banning the headscarf and the goals of preventing coercion, promoting equality and curbing religious extremism is weak and does not justify the ban. This article aptly demonstrates that a headscarf ban is unlikely to achieve any of these goals.
Thirdly, with regards to prohibiting the headscarf to maintain a uniform dress code, it is arguable that an exemption for the headscarf would not undermine the objectives of a uniform dress code or be difficult to administer. 
Conclusion
While a headscarf ban is hailed as a solution to a number of problems, I have sought to illustrate that a headscarf ban is not justifiable. A headscarf ban is in reality rooted in two antithetical stereotypes, namely that Muslim women need to be rescued from the oppressive Islamic faith and that Muslim women with a headscarf pose a terrorist risk to the world. In this regard, the increase in the number of laws prohibiting the wearing of a headscarf should be understood in the current political and social context. After September 11, the fear of terrorism has been translated into Islamophobia and a headscarf ban is often an attempt to suppress the Islamic practices which are viewed as threatening to Western values. The truth is that state policies that prohibit women from wearing headscarves are as problematic as state policies that compel women to wear headscarves. They hinder an individual's ability to adopt a freely undertaken practice and limit autonomy. Accordingly, I have argued that such bans are unjustifiable and South African courts if faced with such a ban should require employers and schools to accommodate the headscarf. 
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